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ABSTRACT: Government, Industry, and Research/University centers are pushing standard bus designs as a way to
achieve Operationally Responsive Space and include faster response, lower cost, and adequate performance with
respect to mission requirements. This paper investigates the Standard Bus Design trades as they relate to mission
performance/utility and areas where standard bus designs may not support the required mission utility. The focus
will be on developing acquisition strategies that the government could employ to promote system interoperability
without sacrificing mission performance.

INTRODUCTION
In the last several years there have been a number of
initiatives started that have attempted to reduce cycle
times and/or program costs associated with the
development and fielding of space systems in support
of the government.
This paper investigates the
concepts and issues associated with standardization
techniques and the resulting impacts on mission
performance and utility. Technology and market forces
coupled, with the government’s desire for quick access
to space, have placed emphasis on the need for
Operationally Responsive Space (ORS). A standard bus
has been associated with this program and there needs
to be a clear understanding of what a “standard bus” is
supposed to accomplish and what a “standard bus”
acquisition strategy implies to the government and
associated Industry partner’s business cases.

There are many standardization initiatives currently in
work, but they appear to be disconnected. In order to
truly implement standardization across aerospace
products, there needs to be a Standards Program Office
or an agreed upon set of requirements that define
standardization.
Standardization can occur at various levels, and
different kinds of standardization can occur at each of
these levels, as shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Different types of standardization can be
implemented at different levels
Level

Architecture

STANDARDIZATION

Typical
Drivers

Mission interface

Customer

Space to Ground interface (Comms,
TT&C, mission planning)?

Standardization means many things to many people.
Currently, there is no common definition for
standardization in the aerospace industry. The word
“standard” has recently been applied to new initiatives
in smaller satellite arenas, specifically ORS. However,
the most critical issue is not the size of the spacecraft,
but the requirements of a program. A large satellite can
have standardization, if there are not numerous
restrictions in the system requirements.

Garfield

Standardization

1

Space to space interface (Comms,
servicing, docking, etc..)?

Spacecraft

Bus, payload
interface

interface,

launch

Subsystem

Algorithms, specifications, electrical
interface (data, command, or power),
mechanical interface (subsystem

Prime
Contractor

Major
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module or panel)

Subcontractor

Component

Electrical interface (data, command,
or power), mechanical interface (bolt
pattern, form), performance

Subcontractor

Piece-part

Performance, form factor

Manufacturer

For example, at the architecture level of a mission,
multiple spacecraft may be interchangeable if the
command and control interfaces to the spacecraft are
standard. The spacecraft do not need to be standard for
this interchangeability, only the interface to the ground
control portion of the system. Electrical interfaces,
including data, command, and power, may be
standardized at either the component level or the
subsystem level, depending on the spacecraft
architecture. An RS-422 data and command interface
with 28V unregulated power could be the standard
panel interface, which is then converted to each nonstandard component as required. Obviously, different
parties will drive the standardization at the different
levels.
LESSONS LEARNED
Standardization has been attempted on a variety of
aerospace programs in the past several decades, with
limited success. This lack of major success is due in
part to the lack of government support and minimal
return on investment to contractors. One of the key
lessons learned is that it is difficult to have standard
buses for varied mission objectives. It is much easier to
have standard subsystems, as they give you more
leverage in the requirements and the design.
The Iridium spacecraft program is often used as a
positive example of satellite standardization. Iridium
was unique from the beginning because it was a
constellation of communications spacecraft that were
conducting a well-defined mission.
Aggressive
delivery schedules and price targets drove the need for
innovation in the satellite manufacturing techniques and
processes. Also, much engineering was re-used from
existing programs and improvements to standardization
were made to subsystem parts and production
processes. This program shared a variety of subsystems
with other programs, which allowed for maximized
discounts from vendors. This, in return, lowered the
recurring costs of the satellite buses. There were also
multiple spacecraft per launch vehicle and each of the
satellites used a standard attach mechanism. The
Iridium program learned that to design in modularity,
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you must design for manufacturing and qualify all
processes for manufacturing design.
Another way to improve spacecraft design and lower
costs and schedule impacts is through investment in
human assets. Once program personnel have the
knowledge to produce a quality spacecraft in a
reasonable amount of time, that knowledge must be
maintained and documented or the entire learning
process is lost and has to be repeated on the next
program. This necessitates the importance of crosstraining these skills to all employees, regardless of
program customer and size, to focus on standardization
and process improvements. Recent college graduates
are a good resource for companies, as they are up to
date on the latest in technology and processes and are
accustomed to completing projects in a relatively short
amount of time.
MISSION AND FUNDING ANALYSES
It is difficult to optimize performance with standard
elements. It is easier to optimize reliability and cost by
using standard systems and simplifying satellite
requirements. Two principle market characteristics
have driven the use of standards: funding and mission
requirements. Each is discussed in the following
sections.
Utility versus Cost
In the small satellite world, small describes not only the
size of the satellite, but also the size of the market. With
the recent enthusiasm for the small satellite market, and
build-up of momentum within the government for small
satellite programs, there is still very little funding. As a
market, the big money is still in larger satellites with
more advanced payloads. These big programs continue
to drive the market. And the market drives standards.
Existing aerospace standards can be adopted from other
markets (e.g. RS-422 driven by electronics markets),
imposed by the customer (e.g. SGLS ground link for
command and control, standard testing regimens, etc.),
or developed over time by common engineering
considerations (28V bus). The first type cannot be
changed, but can be replaced. The last two types have
significant momentum, and are driven by the market
(customer needs, established procedures, common
practices, etc.), which requires large capital
expenditures to provide incentives for change and to
invest in the intellectual and physical capital required to
implement the standard. This requires either funding
from the customer, to whom all costs are eventually
passed, or short term returns to the contractor in order
to provide the incentive for the required investment.
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Long-term returns historically will not provide the
required incentive. It is difficult for contractors to
provide the reduced cost of an nth unit by the 1st or 2nd
vehicle without investment incentives, locking down
requirements very early in a program life cycle, or
establishing block buy contracts.
More than simply reductions in satellites costs, there
must also be a reduction in space mission costs. It is
not only the spacecraft or launch vehicle where costs
can be minimized, but also the operations and number
of people involved in the program must be improved
and reduced from today’s standards.
Utility versus Mission Requirements
When these standard buses are developed, they are
developed
for
standardization,
not
mission
optimization, which leads to gaps in required mission
performance. Although standards may have long-term
or multi-program advantages, implementation of
standards that negatively affect mission performance on
individual programs will not be warmly accepted
without appropriate direction, funding and incentives.
Collective Requirements
The development of standards requires accommodation
of a range of options or performance levels. Although
standards can be implemented at global levels, local
levels, or anything in between, each implementation
must include minimum performance levels. Because the
minimum performance levels must meet the worst case
among the anticipated applications, they will nearly
always be higher than specific applications. This is
compounded when the applications are broad and have
very differing needs, as illustrated in Figure 1.

Requirements of
Application A

Requirements of
Application B

Requirements of
Application C

Standard
Requirements
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Figure 1 - Minimum standards must meet the
requirements of each anticipated application,
resulting in higher performance requirements for
standards than individual applications
The use of standards for unanticipated applications
could result in the standard far exceeding some
requirements and not meeting others. For example, a
spacecraft bus that meets the launch load requirements
for a large group of launch vehicles must be robust
enough to handle the worst vibration and acoustic loads
of the group, resulting in a heavier structural design.
The standard design removes the ability to squeeze the
last little bit of performance from the design, such as
reducing structural mass to minimum safe margin
levels.
Performance Focus
The U.S. aerospace industry is primarily a performance
driven industry. The industry is characterized by high
value, low volume products with multi-year
development. The difficulty of placing space assets into
orbit fundamentally shifts the focus of the market. It is
much more important to accomplish a mission at
minimum risk of failure, than to use the lowest cost
provider that may introduce risk to the mission.
However, some of the foreign aerospace industries
achieve mission success by building more spacecraft
for a certain mission and compensating for any failures
with extra vehicles already in place. Typically, the
benefit of increased performance is more heavily
weighted than the cost of increased performance. These
factors result in performance being the largest
competitive advantage, and therefore the focus of the
contractor. If companies want to position themselves
for higher performance at lower cost, they can do such
things as create separate cost centers or develop
incentives for standardization and smaller program
involvement. Also, leveraging economies of scale can
lower cost and possibly reduce risks with commonly
used and space proven components.
Many spacecraft programs are categorized in the larger
class of platforms because of technology needs, which
mean large payloads and therefore, large buses. There
are technology advancements, which allow our thinking
to change in some respects and look towards smaller
spacecraft as the buses for critical payloads. However,
there are few customer requirements that are pushing
that change in the aerospace industry. Figure 2 takes a
look at the major payload needs and what classes of
launch vehicles they can be transported on into space.
Even though most of these are hosted on large satellite
buses to date, that does not need to be the case in the
future.
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designing for collective requirements and one of the
costs of implementing standards.
At the system level (the level that accepts standard
subsystems) some sacrifices in subsystem performance,
if acceptable to the program, can result in much greater
flexibility. For example, a standard payload interface
provides cost, scheduling, and risk advantages to the
payload and bus. The greatest advantage may be in the
flexibility the standard provides to allow replacement of
one payload with any other payload that meets the same
standards. This flexibility hinges on the acceptability of
the performance sacrifice.

Medium Class

Blue Force
Tracking/Data X

Imaging (HIS)

Hyperspectral

Space Situational
Awareness

Navigation

Communications

Electro Optic (EO)

Synthetic Aperture
Radar (SAR)

Responsive
Signal
Collection

Platform Scales

Capitol Assets

Payloads
Today

Manufacturing Perspective

Future

Figure 2 – Most satellite payloads can function on
smaller, standardized, responsive platforms
Sacrifices Required for Standardization
Standardization, obviously, is not free. The initial
investment to develop the standards and the cost of
implementation can be significant; however, existing
designs could provide a cost effective transition to
improved future designs. Where existing designs are
sufficient, they could be used as initial standards and
pathfinder technologies for more effective future
designs that are tailored to standards from the ground
up. There must also be an organized effort to define a
need for standardization (i.e. budget), as well as
requirements for such an effort, to make this a priority
for companies in the aerospace industry.

The use of standard parts, assemblies, processes, and
tests has been used in many industries to reduce the cost
of mass producing products. The level of non-recurring
engineering to develop new designs, interfaces or
processes can be significant. Standards of this type also
enable experience to be gained by personnel, which
often leads to risk reductions. If spacecraft were able to
imple ment more standards of this type, the
manufacturing, assembly, and testing could realize
large savings. The problem, however, is that multiple
copies of identical spacecraft are rarely purchased. This
benefit of standardization is unlikely to be realized until
spacecraft are purchased in large lots or payload
accommodation techniques are redefined and enable the
use of the same spacecraft bus for multiple missions,
while meeting mission requirements.
Logistics

Standards appear to be most effective in markets where
components and interfaces are relatively static or
functionally isolated, allowing a standard interface to
provide sufficient performance. However, a satellite
nearly always attempts to advance the state of the art
with each new program, inserting new technologies and
optimizing performance. This requires creativity and
flexibility to find ways to extract more performance.
Standardization in the aerospace industry must be
carefully done to ensure adequate performance and
flexibility. Flexibility can be shown in such areas as
payload accommodation, size, weight and power.
At the subsystem level (the level of the unit that must
meet the standard, whether bus, payload, or component)
the freedom to modify the design or interface to
enhance performance is limited when standards are
implemented. This limitation can result in loss of
performance. Traditionally, standardized interfaces or
designs require a certain level of overhead, such as an
increase in mass, volume, power consumption or other
resources. This overhead is principally the result of
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There are a number of logistical advantages from
standardization that benefit mission utility. At the
component level, standardization of interfaces provides
flexibility to select components from multiple vendors
without significant changes to other portions of the
design. The ability to replace a faulty component with
an alternate, especially if required later in the
development cycle, can also reduce mission risk.
Reduction of unique parts, or standardization of a
particular part across a system or assembly, can reduce
mission risk as well, if the parts used are proven and
reliable. At the program level or multi-program level,
standardization can provide the same types of
advantages. In this case, the primary beneficiary is the
customer. For vendors, standardization allows them to
forecast their needs and realize some sort of production
level that can motivate them to invest to manage nonrecurring costs and reduce recurring costs.
Additional advantages are available from the ability for
consistent, common training and accumulation of
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expertise and exp erience. Increasing the number of
units that meet standards enables these advantages.
Optimization Focus
The implementation of standards causes a change in
focus from performance to cost. There are a number of
benefits to standardization, each of which essentially
results in reductions in cost. This cost reduction, as has
been illustrated, comes at the cost of some performance
sacrifice, that must be approved/excepted by the
customer and eventually the end-user
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Market for Standardized Products
The market for standardized products in the aerospace
industry has yet to be established. Some of the key
requirements to make a satellite program cost effective
for a company include quantity buys, inventory of
satellites and concurrent satellite build. To prohibit loss
of knowledge and assets; there must be a limited
amount of time between spacecraft builds. This is due
mainly to technical retention and production line
efficiencies.
Contractor Size and Interest
The size and interests of the contractors has a great deal
to do with their interest in standardization and
responsive space initiatives.
Large contractors can invest more resources into
developing standard products. Some are less likely to
want standard products, which may create increased
competition. It is more difficult to sell their advanced
capabilities with standard systems. Mission success
could benefit from standardization because engineers
will be more familiar with particular components and
therefore more aware of problems. The extra cross
program reviews will put more eyes on every aspect of
the program.
Smaller contractors, with a superior product that meets
standard requirements, may have an easier time
increasing market share, as long as real or perceived
risk is not greater, in which case the established
contractor would still have the advantage. The small
companies have much smaller infrastructures and
personnel, which drives them to focus on one project or
one standard system, at a time.
Medium sized contractors seem the best positioned for
the small satellite market because they have more
resources, but a lower overhead cost structure. This
provides them with the ability to develop and produce
Garfield

5

products at a lower cost to the customer with more
success. The larger companies can challenge the
medium sized contractors’ advantages if they have
different cost centers for the standards market,
performance incentives for like programs and multi-buy
procurements across programs.
Responsive Development
The concepts of rapid development of new spacecraft or
rapid configuration and launch of warehoused satellites
are more easily implemented with some standards in
place. Rapid development is more easily implemented
when performance and interfaces are standard, and do
not require extensive non-recurring engineering to
develop a new project. This can only be implemented if
the standards have been developed and standard
hardware and software have been developed and the
customer has agreed to the limitations that the standard
entails . If these conditions are met, and the
requirements of the new application are satisfied by the
existing designs, then the project can take advantage of
these existing designs to reduce development time and
development cost.
The development of a munitions-style satellite, where a
spacecraft can be configured for several payloads for
pre-defined missions, can take advantage of standards.
A standard payload interface and standard, configurable
software can enable several missions to be completed
with on-demand hardware. Such a program functions
like munitions programs that are configured for various
types of warheads, using the same core delivery
package. This type of program would require
significant development, as it is quite different from
existing programs and processes. The United States
had a 30-minute notice to launch capability in the 1960s
with the ICBM program, which drove the cost of the
program. Is the infrastructure and support cost of a
responsive capability something that we are ready to
support again?
Acquisition Strategies
The best implementation of standards requires the well
thought out and well tested requirements with broad
enough application to be useful, but limited enough to
reduce overhead and inefficiency from trying to be all
things to all needs. The standards must meet the
overlapping and competing needs of the customer,
supplier, and overall industry. Changes in competitive
focus that result from implementation of standards must
be balanced to ensure broad acceptance. All of this
requires investment. Without the investment required to
produce a smart standard, the usefulness and acceptance
will be limited.
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The acquisition process should be changed from a
technology demonstration model to a logistics model.
Emphasis should be placed on cost and reliability, with
more room for negotiation when it comes to the
requirements.
Customers and suppliers both can benefit from
standards. Increased economies of scale on both the
supply-side and demand-side1 can reduce costs and
risks. As discussed earlier, however, the primary focus
of the aerospace industry is on performance. The small
satellite industry may be more cost focused than the
aerospace industry as a whole, but the market for these
types of small satellites is small and uncertain enough
that
the
investment
required
for
effective
implementation and broad acceptance currently may not
be justifiable.

Prime contractor
(reduced NRE and
risk, after 1st units)

Standard component
or component
interface

Prime contractor
(ease of
replacement, greater
competition from
subs)
Subcontractor
(partial leveling of
playing field)

Cost savings and
operational
efficiency or
flexibility desired by
prime contractor is a
disincentive for
subcontractors, but
can be offset by
large purchases, or
the ability for each
subcontractor to
capture a share

Acquisition of standard subsystems versus buses

Benefits of Standard Satellite Buses

Standardization does not need to be applied to the
overall system. It can be applied at the subsystem level,
which uses standard components1 . The component
suppliers compete with each other for market share of
the common or standard part. Differentiation between
suppliers can be in higher than standard performance
(reduced mass, reduced power, higher throughput, etc.)
or in meeting the requirements at a lower cost. Parts
obsolescence is a potential problem with standard buses
that are built many years before their use. This may
contribute to an increase in cost in standardization, if
parts are not easily upgraded. Table 2 shows types of
standards and how different levels of standardization
can support different program parties.

Even though there are challenges with standardization
at the system/segment level, there are benefits that can
not be denied. With this initiative, there is more
potential for rapid development of new designs based
on standardized components. However, block buys are
necessary to see this benefit. Smaller, standard buses
are great platforms for technology maturation. Highend technologies can be proven on lower cost satellites,
so that the high-end assets have reduced program risk
and development times. This might also help with
technology advancement towards smaller sized
payloads for highly critical needs. These programs are
also a great place to train young, energetic engineers.
They learn about the entire system and see results in a
relatively short timeframe.

Table 2: Different levels of standardization affect
different involved parties
Type of
Standard
Multiple program
standard vehicle
(e.g. EELV,
common satellite
bus)

Effected
Parties

Notes

Customer (reduced
cost, increase
competition of prime
contractors)

Cost savings and
operational
efficiency or
flexibility desired by
customer is a
disincentive for
contractors, but can
be offset by large
purchases, or the
ability for each
contractor to capture
a share

Prime contractor
(partial leveling
playing field)

CONCLUSIONS
For standardization to be successful, it needs to balance
mission performance/utility, cost and overall mission
success. There are many instances at the subsystem
and/or component level where standard interfaces and
designs have proven useful. The customer can realize
cost savings and mission utility by creating sound
acquisition strategies that allow contractors to realize
adequate profit margins (it is difficult to get the nth unit
cost on the first production unit). In support of
standardization, large companies need to respond to
new market entrants by creating “Enterprise Zone” cost
centers responsible for addressing the emerging
Operationally Responsive Space market segment.
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